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THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF MAJORITY
SHAREHOLDERS IN FREEZEOUT
MERGERS: A SUGGESTED
APPROACH
INTRODUCTION

The power of minority shareholders to protect their interests when faced
with an imminent merger has over the years yielded to the economic interests
of the majority shareholders. Until state merger statutes were enacted, the
common-law rule was that the merger of one corporation into another could
be prevented by the vote of a single shareholder of the acquired corporation. I
A single shareholder, therefore, could not be forced to continue in a changed
enterprise. Today, however, it is generally recognized that majority shareholders have valid economic reasons for merging and that the minority
shareholders have lost their veto power. 2 In fact, mergers today are "encouraged and favored ''3 as demonstrated by short-form merger statutes which are
designed to eliminate "the minority shareholder's interest in the enterprise." 4
Considerable controversy, however, has surrounded one particular form of
merger-the freezeout merger. In a freezeout merger the acquiring company
pays cash or debt to the minority shareholders of the acquired company for
their equity interest. These mergers are "interested" in that the acquiring
company, or sometimes its shareholders, is the majority shareholder of the
acquired company. Thus, the acquiring company, which stands on both sides
of the transaction, can dictate the terms of the merger agreement and force
1. E. Folk, The Delaware General Corporation Law § 251, at 331 (1972).
2. In addition to the existence of economic justifications for freezeout mergers, see pt. I infra,
the majority shareholder has a fundamental "right to vote his shares in his own interest, including
the expectation of personal profit, limited, of course, by any duty he owes to other stockholders."
Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977); accord, Ringling
Bros.-Barnurn & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch. 610, 622, 53 A.2d 441,
447 (Sup. Ct. 1947).

3. MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 A. 396, 398 (Ch.
1928); accord, Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch. 318, 334, 11 A.2d 331, 338 (Sup.
Ct. 1940).
4. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 11, 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Sup. Ct. 1962); see
Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholders from Freezeouts Through Merger, 22 Wayne L.
Rev. 1421, 1423 (1976).
Short-form merger statutes, which have been enacted in many states, permit the merger of a
90%- or 95%-owned subsidiary with the parent company by the unilateral act of the board of
directors of the parent. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 253 (1975 & Supp. 1977) (90%
ownership); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 905 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1977) (95% ownership). When
the percentage of ownership is not sufficient to comply with the short-form merger statute, the
merger must comply with the long-form merger statute which allows a merger only when a
majority, or in some states two-thirds, of the outstanding stock of both the acquiring and the
acquired company vote in favor of the merger. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251(c) (Supp.
1977) (majority vote required); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 903(a)(2) (McKinney Supp. 1977) (twothirds vote required).
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the minority to receive debt or cash consideration. 5 As a result, the minority
shareholders of the acquired company are frozen out of their equity interest,
and the acquiring company achieves complete control of the acquired company's assets. 6 The inherent potential for unfairness to the
minority due to the
7
coerciveness of such transactions is readily apparent.
In order to balance the competing interests of the majority and minority
shareholders in freezeout mergers, some courts have held that complete
compliance with the applicable merger statute does not in itself make the
action legally valid and have recognized a common-law fiduciary duty owed
by majority shareholders to the minority.8 Two recent Delaware decisions,
Singer v. Magnavox Co. 9 and Tanzer v. International General Industries,
Inc., 10 have attempted to clarify and expand the majority shareholders'
fiduciary duty under Delaware corporation law. In both cases, the Supreme
Court of Delaware reaffirmed the recently eroded'" "entire fairness" standard
which places upon the majority shareholders standing on both sides of the
transaction the burden of proving the merger's fairness to the minority.' 2 The
court also established a new "valid purpose" test which requires the majority
5. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch. 1969), aft'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del.

1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968). Because
of this characteristic, the freezeout merger has been likened to "a sort of private eminent domain
proceeding." Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of the Dissenting Stockholder's AppraisalRight, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 1189, 1191 (1964) (footnote omitted); cf. Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 24 Del. Ch.
318, 334, 11 A.2d 331, 338-39 (Sup. Ct. 1940) (upholding a merger in which a preferred
stockholder lost his right to accumulated dividends).
6. Cf. Cole v. National Cash Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 57, 156 A. 183, 188 (Ch. 1931)
(parent-subsidiary merger treated as a sale by the subsidiary of its assets to the parent).
7.

Despite this potential for unfairness, some state statutes specifically allow mergers in which

cash is given as consideration for the acquired company's stock. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8,
§ 251(b)(4) (Supp. 1977); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:10-1(2)(c) (West Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law § 902(a)(3) (McKinney 1963).
In some situations, a share-for-share merger is the functional equivalent of a freezeout merger.
In a share-for-share merger, the shareholders of the acquired corporation receive equity. If the
terms of the merger are unfair, a dissenting shareholder's sole remedy is to sell his shares at a
judicially appraised price. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 1300 (West 1977); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 33-373 (West 1960 & Supp. 1978), as amended by 1978 Conn. Pub. Acts No. 78-204, § 3; Del.
Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (1975 & Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623(h) (McKinney 1963); 15
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1515(B) (Purdon Supp. 1978). Thus, in either a freezeout merger or an
unfair share-for-share merger, a minority shareholder may lose his equity interest. Freezeout
mergers, however, are more coercive in nature than share-for-share mergers; in the latter the
minority shareholder at least retains the option of continuing as a shareholder.
8. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 975 (Del. 1977); Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 44-45, 342 A.22d 566, 571 (Ch. Div. 1975); cf. Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971) (advancement of annual meeting date in
complete compliance with relevant statute held to violate directors' duty to minority sharehold.
ers); Brundage v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 48 N.J. 450, 470, 226 A.2d 585, 595-96 (1967) (merger
must satisfy requirements of equity and good faith as well as comply with merger statute).
9. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
10. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).

11.
12.

See notes 46-53 infra and accompanying text.
See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
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to prove some economic purpose for the merger.' 3 Together, these two
standards set forth the fiduciary duty owed to minority shareholders. Singer
and Tanzer, therefore, represent an important development in corporate law
because they broaden
the needed protection for minority shareholders in
14
freezeout mergers.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the impact of Singer and Tanzer on
the determination of the fairness of freezeout mergers. Part I will examine the
competing interests of minority and majority shareholders in the two general
kinds of freezeout mergers-parent-subsidiary mergers and shell corporation
mergers. Part II will consider the judicial solution to this problem of conflicting interests as set forth in Singer and Tanzer. Part III will discuss the future
implications of these two decisions and will argue that the valid purpose
requirement is confusing and unnecessary because the entire fairness standard, if broadly interpreted, may itself be sufficient to balance adequately the
competing interests of majority and minority shareholders in freezeout
mergers.
I.

COMPETING INTERESTS OF MAJORITY AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
IN FREEZEOUT MERGERS

A. Reasons for Parent-SubsidiaryMergers
A parent-subsidiary merger is a merger between two companies, one of
which is the majority shareholder of the other. Through its control of both
sides of the transaction, the parent company may force the shareholders of the
subsidiary to accept cash for their shares, thereby freezing the minority out of
their equity interest. Is The parent, which effectively controlled the subsidiary
prior to the merger, thus acquires complete control over the combined
entities.
When complete control replaces stock affiliation, particularly when the
parent and subsidiary are engaged in similar business activities, the change
may create a synergistic gain-that is, the value of the combined entity may
exceed the sum of the values of the parent and subsidiary operated separately.1 6 For example, a parent-subsidiary merger may facilitate the parent's
long-term debt financing because complete control over the subsidiary's assets
enables the parent to pledge those assets as collateral for loans. 17 Synergistic
gain also occurs in the form of operating economies achieved through the
elimination of duplicative functions or through the creation of tax savings. 18
13. See note 69 infra and accompanying text.
14. Because of the importance of these two Delaware cases, this Note will focus primarily on
Delaware law.
15. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
16. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 Harv. L
Rev. 297, 308 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Fair Shares]; see Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Fla. 1974), fft'd, 521 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1975)
(greater control of subsidiary assets as a result of the parent-subsidiary merger generated savings
of more than $300,000 per year).
17. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977); Brudney
& Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freemeouts, 87 Yale L.J. 1354, 1375 (1978).
18. FairShares, supra note 16, at 308. One example of such tax savings is the elimination of
a double tax whereby the subsidiary is taxed on its profits which in turn are taxed to the parent as
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Parent-subsidiary mergers may also eliminate potential conflicts of interest
between the two companies. A danger of self-dealing arises when the two
companies engage in significant business transactions with each other. The
absence of arm's length bargaining may result in transfers of assets that are
unfair to the subsidiary. On the other hand, efforts to avoid self-dealing may
inhibit otherwise valid transactions between the two companies. 19 Merger of
the two companies, however, creates a single corporate entity within which
assets can be freely transferred, thereby eliminating any potential self-dealing.
Although synergistic gains and the elimination of self-dealing are valid
economic reasons for parent-subsidiary mergers, neither benefit requires cashing out the minority. These benefits will occur whenever the parent company
obtains complete control over the subsidiary. Thus, they can be achieved
regardless of whether the minority shareholders receive cash or equity. 20
Moreover, in the case of synergistic gains, freezing out the minority yields
greater profitability for the majority without giving the minority their corresponding share. The majority, therefore, achieve some of this profitability at
the direct expense of the minority shareholders being cashed out. Offering
equity rather than cash or debt would avoid this unfairness to the minority.
B.

Reasons for Shell CorporationMergers
Shell corporation mergers (also known as pure going private mergers) are
accomplished through the use of a shell corporation set up by the majority
shareholders of an existing company. The shell corporation conducts no
business of its own, and its sole initial purpose is to serve as a vehicle for
effectuating a merger. Through their control of both companies, the majority
shareholders merge the original company into the shell company under terms
that give the minority shareholders of the original company cash for their
stock, thereby eliminating their interest. 21 Unlike a parent-subsidiary merger,
synergistic gains are not possible in a shell corporation merger because the
acquiring company is a shell without any operating business or assets.
Therefore, the profitability of a shell corporation merger depends solely upon
the elimination of the minority shareholders.
Cashing out the minority enables the majority shareholders to decrease the
dividends when they are distributed to it as a shareholder. After a parent-subsidiary merger, the
second tax on the subsidiary's dividends is eliminated and the parent pays only the single profits
tax. I.R.C. § 243, however, renders this tax advantage of parent-subsidiary mergers less
significant by allowing a corporation to deduct 85% of the dividends received from its domestic
subsidiaries. Therefore, the 15% of the dividends received that is treated as taxable income to the
parent would be eliminated from the parent corporation's taxable income by a parent-subsidiary
merger. Whether this 15% dividend tax savings represents a significant economic justification for
a particular parent-subsidiary merger will depend on the value of the parent's stock in Its
subsidiary in relation to the value of the parent's other income-producing assets.
19. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970) (parent avoided
dealings with its subsidiary); cf. Wolfensohn v. Madison Fund, Inc., 253 A.2d 72 (Del. 1969)
(filing of consolidated tax returns by a parent and subsidiary caused suit for self-dealing).
20. See Borden, Some Comments on Singer v. Magnavox, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1977, at 5, col.

1.
21. See, e.g., Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974); People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.) (mem.), aff'd, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377
N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975); Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025 (1952).
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total number of shareholders and thereby obtain several advantages.
Reduction of the number of shareholders to less than three hundred exempts

the company from certain Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regis-

tration requirements. 2 2 The corporation would then not have to send proxy
statements and annual reports to its shareholders. 23 Additional costs that
would be eliminated include auditing and legal fees associated with the filing
of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports with the SEC. 24 Costs of annual
meetings, transfer agents, and stock certificates could also be reduced when a
company decreases the number of its shareholders. 25 The total possible
reduction of these costs has been estimated to be in the range of $75,000 to
$200,000 per year for an average-sized
public company listed on a national
26
exchange before the merger.
Another advantage of the shell corporation merger is that the corporation
can delist its stock. 2 7 This permits the management to conduct business
without considering the impact of its business decisions on the market price of
the company's stock. This freedom enables a corporation to adopt a policy of
long-term speculative capital development rather than short-term earnings
growth or large dividend payouts, and to adopt more conservative accounting
28
practices that would lower the corporation's taxes.
Finally, majority shareholders in shell corporation mergers can obtain
considerable profits by using stock market fluctuations to eliminate minority
shareholders at a low price. 29 This situation arises when a company, which
previously went public by issuing stock during a boom market, forces the
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(4) (1976).
23. This cost reduction has been found to be the biggest advantage of going private. See
Note, Going Private, 84 Yale L.J. 903, 904 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Going Private].
24. These reports are required by §§ 13(a) and 15(d) of the Seceities Exchange Act of 1934,

15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a)(2), 78o(d) (1976). On the other hand, these savings may be offset by the
immediate costs of effectuating a going private merger, including legal, accounting, and brokerage
expenses. See Going Private, supra note 23, at 907-08.
25. See Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 987,
1007 (1974). In a parent-subsidiary merger, whether the parent is publicly or privately held
is important in evaluating the economic justifications for the merger, see id. at 1018-19, because if
the parent is privately held, a merger with its publicly held subsidiary results in these same costs
reductions. When the parent is publicly held, however, the costs of disclosure, auditing and legal
fees, transfer agents and stock certificates remain and are merely transferred to the parent
corporation. See Fair Shares, supra note 16, at 308.
26. FairShares, supra note 16, at 308. Costs of SEC registration and compliance alone have
been estimated to be in excess of $100,000 annually for a similarly sized company. Going Private,
supra note 23, at 907.
27. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(d), 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1976); New York Stock
Exchange, Inc., Company Manual § A 16, at A-291 to -292.1 (1978).
28. By contrast, when the number of shareholders in a company is larger, many shareholders
will desire short-run profitability for their stock, a factor which in turn influences corporate
decisionmaking on the management level. Borden, supra note 25, at 1006-07.
29. See Berkowitz v. Power/late Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 43, 342 A.2d 566, 570 (Ch.
Div. 1975); Comment, Protection of Minority Shareholdersfrom Freeeouts Through Merger, 22
Wayne L. Rev. 1421, 1432-33 (1976); Going Private, supra note 23, at 905-06, 923; Address by A.
A. Sommer, Jr., "Going Private". A Lesson in CorporateResponsibility, Law Advisory Council
Lecture, Notre Dame Law School (Nov. 20, 1974), reprinted in (1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) , 80,010.
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minority, at a time when the stock market is depressed, to sell back their
shares at a fraction of the original purchase price. Although this type of shell
corporation merger may be very profitable for the majority shareholders,
commentators do not consider the economic reasons supporting it to be
acceptable because the advantages to the majority are achieved at the direct
expense of the cashed-out minority. 30 The use of stock market fluctuations to
eliminate minority shareholders at depressed prices results in obvious unfairness to the minority because they are forced to sell at a time unilaterally
determined by the majority and are unable to wait for a more propitious
moment. 31 Because the potential for unfairness to the minority shareholders
in such stock-market-manipulating mergers is great, courts, on occasion,
have carefully scrutinized the timing of shell corporation32 mergers in relation
to the market price of the acquired company's stock.
If the majority have taken advantage of a depressed stock market, the
chances are great that the minority shareholder's basis will exceed the amount
realized and that he will incur a capital loss when forced to sell his stock in
the merger. Although this ability to take a loss has been considered a benefit
to minority shareholders in freezeout mergers, 33 the tax consequences are, in
fact, disadvantageous to minority shareholders. The unfairness arises from
the fact that the minority shareholders are unable to choose when to realize
34
the loss and may, therefore, be unable to use it at the time of merger.
Alternatively, if the stock has appreciated by the time of the merger, the tax
consequences will be even more disadvantageous to the minority shareholder
who is cashed out, for he will be unable to choose the35most advantageous time
in which to recognize a taxable gain on the sale.
Given the possibility that both parent-subsidiary and shell corporation
freezeout mergers may be unfair to minority shareholders in price offered, in
tax consequences, or in their general coercive nature, there is a need for some
kind of mechanism to protect the minority's interests. At present, minority
shareholders have three options when confronted with an unfair freezeout
merger: (1) accept the terms of the merger agreement; (2) seek an appraisal of
his shares under the state's appraisal statute;36 or (3) sue for an injunction,
30. For a list of commentary on this point, see Berkowitz v. Power/lMate Corp., 135 N.J.
Super. 36, 43, 342 A.2d 566, 570 (Ch. Div. 1975).
31. This may also be the case in parent-subsidiary mergers. See Greene, CorporateFreeze.out
Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 487, 493 (1976).
32. See Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super. 36, 48, 342 A.2d 566, 573 (Ch.
Div. 1975). See generally Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974); Albright v. Bergendahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974).
33. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971).
34. If the minority shareholders had wanted a capital loss, they would have taken It
voluntarily by selling their stock on the open market. The fact that the shareholders are being
forced out indicates that they had no desire to take the loss at that particular time.
35. The tax itself is not at issue because the minority shareholder (or his donee or devisee)
would have to pay the tax eventually. Prior to 1976 the shareholder could have completely
avoided capital gains taxes on the appreciation during his lifetime by holding the stock until
death, thus giving his beneficiaries a step-up in basis equal to the fair market value of the stock at
the time of death. I.R.C. § 1014(a). This tax advantage, however, is no longer possible for
shareholders dying after December 31, 1976. I.R.C. §§ 1014(d), 1023(a)(1).
36. An appraisal right is a statutory right that permits shareholders who dissent from certain
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damages, or other appropriate remedy. 37 Appraisal statutes are generally
considered inadequate because of the delay, expense, and uncertainty of the

appraisal process. 38 However, even if an appraisal gives the minority a fair
40
price for their stock, 39 the coercive character of the merger remains.

Because freezeout mergers are potentially unfair and the appraisal remedy is
frequently inadequate, seeking relief in the courts is usually the only option
left open to the minority shareholders for obtaining complete redress.
H.

JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF THE MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS

A.

PriorDevelopments-Sterlingto Sante Fe

Protection of minority shareholders in interested mergers originated in
Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp.41 In Sterling, the Supreme Court of
Delaware first enunciated the entire fairness standard for interested mergers
of all types, be they freezeout or share-for-share mergers. In that case, a
parent company merged with an eighty-five-percent-owned subsidiary and
offered one share of the parentes stock for each share of the subsidiary's
stock. 4 2 Although the minority shareholders were unsuccessful in enjoining
the merger, the court held that because the parent company and its directors
"stand on both sides of the transaction, they bear the burden of establishing
[the merger's] entire fairness, and it must pass the test of careful scrutiny by
corporate actions, including mergers, and who believe the consideration offered is inadequate, to
require the corporation to purchase their shares at a court approved appraisal price. See
Manning, The Shareholder'sAppraisalRemedy: An Essayfor Frank Coker, 72 Yale LJ.223, 226
(1962).
37. These remedies are possible only when the applicable appraisal statute is not exclusive.
Some state appraisal statutes expressly provide that they are exclusive remedies. See, e.g., Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-373(f) (West 1960); IMl.Ann. Stat. ch. 32, §§ 157.70, .73 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1978); 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1515(B) (Purdon Supp. 1978). On the other hand, the North
Carolina statute expressly states that it is not exclusive. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-113 (1975). In the
leading states of incorporation, however, the appraisal statutes are silent as to exclusivity. See,
e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262 (1975 & Supp. 1977); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623(h)
(McKinney 1963).
38. Manning, supra note 36, at 233; Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1201. If the stock of the
acquired company is listed on a national exchange or is widely held, appraisal is sometimes not
even available. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(k) (Supp. 1977). Although the company is
often forced to pay the cost of the appraisal, counsel, and expert fees, minority shareholders may
sometimes be forced to pay all or a portion of these costs. Compare N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 623
(h)(7) (McKinney 1963) (corporation pays the cost of appraisal unless dissenter's "refusal to accept
the corporate offer was arbitrary, vexatious or otherwise not in good faith") with Del. Code Ann.
tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1977) (costs may be taxed to either party as court deems equitable).
This possibility may further discourage a minority shareholder from demanding an appraisal.
39. Because the appraiser is usually unable to assess the real value of the minority stock, it is
often underestimated. Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1202-03.
40. For example, the minority shareholder who dissents may still suffer adverse tax consequences. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
41. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
42. Although Sterling and other early Delaware decisions that applied the fairness standard to
interested mergers were not freezeout mergers, and therefore lacked certain elements usually
present in freezeout mergers, the standard and most of the factors involved are equally applicable
to freezeout mergers. See notes 66-68 infra and accompanying text.
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the courts. '43 The court did not attempt to define its concept of entire
fairness, but it did hold that all relevant circumstances must be considered
shares of the acquired corporaand that the liquidation value of the minority
44
tion is not the sole determining factor.

Subsequent decisions by the Delaware Court of Chancery involving interested mergers left the status of the Sterling rule in doubt. In Bruce v. E. L.
Bruce Co., 45 the court appeared to undercut the requirements enunciated in
Sterling, holding that "absent fraud or a showing that the terms of a proposed
merger are so unfair as to shock the conscience of the court," an interested
merger will not be enjoined. 46 Although Bruce appeared to be in direct
conflict with the Sterling rule, the court in David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
International,Inc. 47 distinguished it by the fact that the plaintiffs in Bruce
did not allege intrinsic unfairness as did the plaintiffs in Sterling. In Dunhill,
the court reaffirmed the Sterling entire fairness test and granted the minority
shareholders a preliminary injunction because the parent company had not
met 48its burden of proving to the court's satisfaction that the transaction was
fair.

In David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Industries, Inc., 49 the Delaware
Court of Chancery again appeared to reverse its position. In that case,
involving a parent-subsidiary freezeout merger, the parent company had
merged with its eighty-six-percent-owned subsidiary and had given the minority shareholders cash and subordinated debentures for their stock. The court
held that the minority shareholders had to prove fraud or blatant overreaching by the parent in order to enjoin the merger because they were contesting
only the value placed on their shares by the parent company and had not
alleged any self-dealing in the transaction."0 The court distinguished Dunhill
as involving more than a dispute as to value because the minority shareholders there had alleged that the parent company had seized a corporate
opportunity of its subsidiary prior to the merger in order to depress the value
of the subsidiary's stock.5 1 Although the Schenley court did not expressly
define its standards of fraud or blatant overreaching, the factors on which
Dunhill was distinguished suggest that minority shareholders would have to
show self-dealing either by circumstantial evidence of grossly inadequate
consideration or by direct evidence of actions52by the parent that depressed the
value of its subsidiary before the merger.
43. 33 Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at i10 (citations omitted).
44. Id. at 305, 93 A.2d at 113.
45. 40 Del. Ch. 80, 174 A.2d 29 (Ch. 1961).
46. Id. at 82, 174 A.2d at 30.
47. 249 A.2d 427, 431 (Del. Ch. 1968).
48. Id. at 436.
49. 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
50. Id. at 35.
51. Id. The court found a further distinction in that the combination in Dunhill would have
caused a drastic reduction of the pro forma earnings of the subsidiary. Id. The plaintiffs In
Dunhill, in addition to claiming that the parent preempted a corporate opportunity of Its
subsidiary, alleged that the parent company, through its stock control, had forced the
subsidiary to pay inadequate dividends before the merger, thereby depressing the price of the
subsidiary's stock. 249 A.2d at 429-30.
52. An example of this type of self-dealing occurs when a parent, prior to the merger, causes
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Schenley, therefore, created an exception to the Sterling rule of entire
fairness when the minority allege only unfairness of price without showing

any self-dealing. This exception appears unsound because minority shareholders often cannot allege more than unfairness of price since they lack the

necessary financial information concerning the parent's or subsidiary's activities before and after the merger. s 3 Thus, the exception virtually engulfed

the rule. Schenley, therefore, along with Bruce, afforded little protection to
minority shareholders in interested mergers.

In addition, minority shareholders have had great difficulty in receiving
the needed protection under federal law. The Supreme Court in Sante Fe

Industries, Inc. v. Green,5 4 held that, even if the majority shareholders had
breached their fiduciary duty under state law, a merger does not involve
deception or manipulation within the strictures of rule 10b-5 ss merely because
the minority shareholders are cashed out without a legitimate business purpose. s 6 The S7Court therefore left protection of minority shareholders to the
state courts.

an unfair distribution of tax benefits between itself and its subsidiary such that the value of the
subsidiary is depressed. See, e.g., Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 246 A.2d 789 (Del. Ch.
1967); Case v. New York Cent. R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d 643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965).
53. Not only does the exception restrict the protection for minority shareholders in interested
mergers, but it is also unsound because the burden of proof should be upon the party who has
easier access to information. One commentator has suggested that in order to enable minority
shareholders to judge whether they have been dealt with fairly in a freezeout merger, a company
which goes public should be required to covenant that, in the event it subsequently goes private,
financial statements covering a one-year period after the freezeout will be available to former
shareholders. See Borden, supra note 25, at 1030. Although the commentator was considering
only shell corporation mergers, a similar procedure might apply to parent-subsidiary mergers.
54. 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (parent-subsidiary merger).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1977).
56. 430 U.S. at 474. The Court said that to hold otherwise "would be to bring within the Rule
a wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation. . . . ITlhis. . . would
overlap and quite possibly interfere with state corporate law." Id. at 478-79. The Court followed
its earlier language to the effect that unless "federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities
of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the internal affairs of the
corporation." Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (implied right of action does not exist under 18
U.S.C. § 610 (1970 & Supp. 1I 1973) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976)), which prohibits
corporations from making contributions in connection with federal elections). The lower court in
Santa Fe had given protection to minority shareholders by construing rule l0b-S, 17 C.F.R. §
240. lOb-5 (1977), to include cashing out minority interests without a legitimate business purpose.
Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); accord,
Marshel v. AFV Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 881
(1976). See generally Note, Federal "Going Private"Standards:A New Direction for the Second
Circuit? 45 Fordham L. Rev. 427, 437-42 (1976).
57. The SEC, however, has recently proposed a new rule, SEC Release No. 33-5884 (Nov.
17, 1977), reprinted in [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 81,366, which
would require the majority shareholders or the parent company that force a freezeout merger
upon the minority to disclose in advance of the merger the terms of the transaction, the source
and amount of funds used, and the method used by the parent to determine the consideration to
be- given to minority shareholders. Id. at 88,751-53. The rule would also require that the
transaction be substantively fair as determined by such factors as the percentage of disinterested
shareholders and directors who approved the merger, the current and historical market prices of
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B. The DelawareResponse in Singer and Tanzer
The Supreme Court of Delaware, recognizing the need for state protection of
minority shareholders in freezeout mergers, reacted to Sante Fe in two recent
decisions, Singer v. Magnavox Co." s and Tanzer v. International General
Industries, Inc." In Singer, the court held that elimination of minority
shareholders without a valid business purpose was a violation of the majority
shareholders' fiduciary duty to the minority. In that case, T.M.C. Development Corp. had merged with its eighty-four-percent-owned subsidiary, Magnavox Co., in compliance with Delaware's long-form merger statute. 60 The
minority shareholders of Magnavox were offered $9.00 per share under the
merger agreement. Plaintiff, one of the minority shareholders, sought an order
nullifying the merger and granting compensatory damages. 6 1 The lower court
dismissed the action, deciding that plaintiff's sole remedy was to seek appraisal under Delaware's appraisal statute. 62 The supreme court reversed and
held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action when he alleged that the
merger had been effectuated for the sole purpose of freezing out the minority
shareholders. 63 The court thus reaffirmed the entire fairness standard which
had been established twenty-five years earlier in Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel
Corp.64 The fairness standard places upon the "majority stockholder standing
on both sides of the merger transaction . . . 'the burden of establishing its
entire fairness' to the minority shareholders, sufficiently to 'pass the test of
careful scrutiny by the courts.' "65 Although Sterling involved an interested
share-for-share merger while Singer involved an interested freezeout merger,
the fairness standard is even more appropriately applied to freezeout mergers
because, in addition to the potential for self-dealing involved, 66 freezeout
the stock, the book value and going concern value of the acquired company, and the likely tax
consequences of the merger. Id. at 88,752.
The SEC has attempted to circumvent Sante Fe by promulgating the new rule under § 13(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e) (1976), rather than § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b) (1976). The SEC chose § 13(e) because it uses the broader term "fraudulent" practices,
whereas § 10(b) refers only to "manipulative or deceptive" practices. The use of this distinction to
federalize substantive law on freezeout transactions ha been criticized. See Fogg, SEC Seeks
FederalRole Despite Sante Fe Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at 44, col. 1. Whether the rule
will be adopted will probably depend upon the degree to which states increase and define their
protection for minority shareholders in the near future.
58. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
59. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
60. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (1975). The long-form merger statute requires approval by
the board of directors of each company and by those shareholders of each company who represent
a majority of the outstanding stock. Id.
61. 380 A.2d at 972.
62. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1362 (Del. Ch. 1976).
63. 380 A.2d at 980.
64. 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Sup. Ct. 1952), discussed at notes 41-44 supra
and accompanying text.
65. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 976 (quoting Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33
Del. Ch. at 298, 93 A.2d at 109-10).
66. In Singer, for example, although the court did not discuss the issue, there was evidence of
self-dealing by the parent company. The directors of the subsidiary had initially voted to oppose
the merger on the ground of inadequacy of price, but withdrew their opposition after they were
offered two-year employment contracts by the parent company. Id. at 971.
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mergers may lead to adverse tax consequences for the minority shareholders. 67 Furthermore, they constitute a method whereby the parent company

shareholders to sell their shares when the stock market
can force the 6minority
8
is depressed.

To ensure that elimination of the minority shareholders was not the sole
purpose, the Singer court created a requirement of a valid business purpose
for long-form freezeout mergers. 69 The court gave no clue, however, as to
what would constitute a valid business purpose and even warned that an
inquiry into such a requirement might result in confusion. 70 It expressly left

open whether the business purpose accomplished by7 1the merger could be that
of the subsidiary rather than that of the parent.

One month after the Singer decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware
72

answered this question in Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc.
The court held that the requirement is satisfied when the merger is effected
solely to advance the business purpose of the parent corporation. 7 3 The court

also substituted the words "bona fide purpose" for the "business purpose"

language used in Singer.74 The effect of this change in language is undeter-

mined at present. It is clear, however, that, by allowing mergers that benefit
only the parent corporation, the court in Tanzer broadened the permissiveness

of the purpose requirement enunciated in Singer. The only reason for the
long-term debt financing, a
merger in Tanzer was to facilitate the parents
7 S
purpose which the court held to be valid.

Although neither Singer nor Tanzer dealt directly with the Schenley exception, 76 the court's affirmation of the Sterling entire fairness standard would
seem to indicate that the Supreme Court of Delaware has rejected the

exception. The lower court in Singer followed the Schenley exception by
holding that the minority shareholders must allege fraud or blatant overreach67. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
68. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
69. 380 A.2d at 978-80. The court first stated that complete compliance with the merger
statute did not necessarily make the merger valid, id. at 975, and that the appraisal remedy is not
exclusive in Delaware, id. at 977. This holding creates the possibility of injunction which in turn
gives the minority shareholders greater bargaining power against the majority than they had with
the appraisal remedy. In addition, while the appraisal remedy allows the courts to consider only
the adequacy of the consideration offered to the minority, a fairness standard takes into account
additional relevant factors such as the economic necessity of the merger, any evidence of
self-dealing by the majority, and any adverse tax consequences to the minority.
70. Id. at 976.
71. "Plaintiffs contend that a 'business purpose' is proper in a merger only when it serves the
interests of the subsidiary corporation; defendants contend, on the other hand, that if any
[business] purpose is relevant, it is only that of the parent corporation. . . . [NV]e leave [this
question] to another day." Id. at 980 n.11.
72. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). Tanzer, like Singer, involved a long-form freezeout merger in
which the parent corporation owned eighty-one percent of its subsidiary's stock before merging.
73. Id. at 1123.
74. Id. at 1124-25.
75. Id. at 1124; see note 17 supra.
76. When the minority shareholders complain only that the consideration offered in an
interested merger is inadequate, the Schenley exception provides that the appraisal remedy is
adequate and exclusive. See notes 49-52 supra and accompanying text.
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ing in order to state a cause of action. 7 7 Although this language of the lower
court indicates its findings that the Schenley exception was completely applicable to the merger in Singer, the supreme court refused to apply it. Instead,
the court distinguished the facts of Schenley on the ground that Schenley did

not involve a freezeout merger because the minority were offered debt and
cash rather than cash alone. 78 This was a mischaracterization, however,
because debt does not represent a permanent voting interest in the combined

entity, as does stock. 79 Thus, in both Singer and Schenley the minority
shareholders were frozen out of their equity interest. Therefore, the broad
fiduciary duty imposed on majority shareholders by Singer should apply with
equal force to the Schenley facts.

In short, Singer and Tanzer have affected freezeout mergers in two ways.
First, they reaffirmed the entire fairness standard which had been eroded
since its enunciation in Sterling.8 0 Second, they established a new valid
purpose requirement for long-form freezeout mergers. 8' These two cases thus

represent a restriction on the use of the merger statute to eliminate minority
shareholders. Although both Singer and Tanzer arose out of long-form freezeout mergers, lower court cases have applied the purpose requirement and the
entire fairness standard to short-form freezeout mergers as well. 82 This

development is clearly warranted once it is recognized that the unfairness to
the minority shareholders is just as great when the majority own ninety

percent of the stock (the minimum required under Delaware's 83short-form
merger statute) as when they own eighty percent of the stock.

77. "[The plaintiffs were seeking] to set aside the merger as being fraudulent because the cash
price per share to be paid to minority shareholders was inadequate.
"When this is the basis for objection to a corporate merger, it is established law that the remedy
of the dissatisfied shareholders is to seek an appraisal of the value of their shares pursuant to the
procedures set forth under the appraisal statute." Singer v. Magnavox Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1362
(Del. Ch. 1976).
78. 380 A.2d at 979.
79. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein define freezeouts to include mergers in which minority
shareholders receive debt. Brudney & Chirelstein, sulra note 17 at 1357.
80. See notes 45-53 supra and accompanying text.
81. The valid purpose requirement is not to be confused with the business judgment rule for
which the defendants had argued unsuccessfully in Tanzer. See 379 A.2d at 1124. The business
judgment rule requires a showing of gross and palpable overreaching on the part of the
management in order to overturn a business decision. Thus, in Delaware it has been applied only
when a disinterested third party sets the terms of the transaction. See Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil
Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970).
82. See Najjar v. Roland Int'l Corp., 387 A.2d 701 (Del. Ch. 1978) (denial of motion to
dismiss because complaint alleged that sole purpose of short-form freezeout merger was elimination of minority interests); Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977) (preliminary Injunction
granted against proposed short-form freezeout merger).
83. See Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). In Kemp, the court said that it
"fall[ed] to see how a determination as to whether or not the duty now imposed on a majority
stockholder in a merger based on [the short-form merger statute] has been properly carried out
requires any less scrutiny by the Trial Court than that called for in a case in which the rights of
minority stockholders have been allegedly diminished by a merger based on [the long-form merger
statute]." Id. at 244.
The court in Singer, however, did not seem to recognize this point. In an earlier decision,

1978]

FREEZEOUT MERGERS
II.

FURTHER IM PLICATIONS

A. The Entire Fairness Standard
Although Singer and Tanzer reaffirmed the entire fairness standard, neither
decision dearly established the factors to be used in determining the fairness
of a particular merger. Therefore, further analysis of the standard is warranted.
At the outset, it should be noted that the entire fairness standard only
applies to "interested" mergers, like shell corporation and parent-subsidiary
mergers, in which the majority shareholders stand on both sides of the
transaction. 84 In contrast, when a merger is accomplished between two
unrelated companies dealing at arm's length, the standard for judicial disapproval is fraud or the equivalent thereof 85 because "[]n the absence of divided
interests, the judgment of the majority stockholders and/or the board of
directors. . . is presumed made in good faith and inspired by bona fides of
purpose. '8 6 On the other hand, when the majority shareholders stand on both
sides of a transaction and control its terms, the potential for unfairness is
greater, 87 and the presumption of bona fides of purpose no longer exists.8 8
Adequacy of consideration paid for the minority's shares-the primary
concern of courts applying the entire fairness standard prior to Singer and
Tanzer"g-will probably continue to be a central criterion. The rationale
underlying a court's examination of the adequacy of consideration was to
ensure that minority shareholders in an interested merger would receive the
same consideration for their shares as they would have received had they been
dealing at arm's length. To determine adequacy of consideration courts
considered the fair market price of the stocks involved, particularly when
traded in an open market, 90 the value of each company as a going concern, 9'
Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup. Ct. 1962), the court had held
that the appraisal remedy was exclusive for short-form freezeout mergers absent a showing of
actual fraud. Instead of overruling the decision, the court in Singer simply said that "[alny
statement in Stauffer inconsistent herewith is held inapplicable to a [long-form] merger." 380 A.2d
at 980. This statement seems to imply that the court was distinguishing between long-form and
short-form freezeout mergers.
84.

Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 682 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (Del.

1970). See generally Keenan v. Eshleman, 23 Del. Ch. 234, 243-44, 2 A.2d 904, 908 (Sup. Ct.
1938).
85. Cole v. National Credit Ass'n, 18 Del. Ch. 47, 156 A. 183 (Ch. 1931).
86. David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430 (Del. Ch. 1968).
87. The reason for this is that the majority can unilaterally set the terms of the merger
agreement. See notes 6, 15, 21 supra and accompanying text.
88. David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 430-31 (Del. Ch. 1968)
(dictum).
89. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct.

1952); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971).
90. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 34 (Del. Ch. 1971). See
generally Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922
(1977).
91. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 20, 28, 89 A.2d 862, 867 (Ch.), af'd,
33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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past earnings
and dividend records, 92 and the liquidity value of the minority's
93
stock.

Even though the adequacy of consideration factor of the entire fairness
standard was developed in the share-for-share interested merger context, it is
equally applicable to freezeout mergers. 94 The Tanzer court, however, in
applying the entire fairness standard to' a freezeout merger, stated that all
features of the transaction, rather than just adequacy of consideration, are
relevant. 9s This extension appears sound in light of the coerciveness of
96

freezeout mergers that is absent in share-for-share interested mergers.
Courts can only identify this coerciveness and determine the entire fairness of
the merger by reviewing such nonprice factors as the timing of the merger in
relation to the general condition of the stock market, any evidence of
self-dealing, and the tax consequences to the minority shareholders. 97 On the

other hand, economic justifications for freezeout mergers may outweigh the
unfairness and thus should also enter into the court's determination.
The entire fairness standard, therefore, calls for a broad balancing test in
which the above nonprice factors, the adequacy of consideration, and the
economic justifications for the merger are considered. 98 In light of the unique
and varied situations in which freezeout mergers arise, a broad balancing test
would enable courts to consider the fairness of each merger individually
without declaring all freezeout mergers per se unfair. The entire fairness
standard as such is indeterminate, but necessarily so, because the competing
interests vary with each particular freezeout merger. 99

In contrast to this suggestion of a broad balancing test for all types of
92. See David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 433 (Del. Ch. 1968); cf.
Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 1973), ff0'd,
334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975) (appraisal must be based upon historical rather than prospective
earnings).
93. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 305, 93 A.2d 107, 113 (Sup. Ct.
1952); cf. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 1977) (liquidity value-the amount a
shareholder would receive if the company is liquidated and its assets sold-is one factor, but not
the sole factor, in appraising dissenting shareholders' stock).
94. See notes 66768 supra and accompanying text.
95. 379 A.2d at 1125.
96. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
97. See notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.
98. Ratification of the merger by a majority of the disinterested shareholders is another factor
which might be considered in determining fairness. Of course, shareholder ratification Is not
always an accurate determinant in light of the management's control over the proxy machinery.
See FairShares, supra note 16, at 300. In addition, the minority shareholders are usually unable
to influence the terms of the merger agreement and are therefore left with either accepting or
rejecting the merger. Thus, a vote to accept is not necessarily an indication of the minority's
complete satisfaction with the terms of the merger agreement. Id. At present, the effect of
disinterested shareholder ratification is still unclear in Delaware. Compare Bastian v. Bourns,
Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 682 (Del. Ch. 1969), aff'd, 278 A.2cd 467 (Del. 1970) with David J. Greene &
Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427, 432 (Del. Ch. 1968).
99. Similarly, the standard of loyalty that people who control corporate property owe to the
shareholders is "measured by no fixed scale." Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 270, 5 A.2d
503, 510 (Sup. Ct. 1939). The proposed SEC rule also appears to require a balancing approach; It
enumerates the factors to be considered but provides no definite standard for determining
fairness. See note 57 supra.
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freezeout mergers, Professors Brudney and Chirelstein propose in a recent
article that freezeout mergers be classified into three categories with different
standards of fairness applying to each. °0 They classify freezeout mergers as
follows: shell corporation or going private mergers,10 1 two-step mergers in
which an unrelated acquiring corporation first gains stock control in the
acquired corporation through a tender offer and then eliminates the remaining
stockholders by way of a freezeout merger,10 2 and mergers between long-held
affiliates.' 0 3 Brudney and Chirelstein conclude that shell corporation mergers
should always be prohibited, and that two-step mergers should always be
allowed. Only in the case of mergers between long-held affiliates should a
balancing test be applied whereby the common-law fiduciary duty of the
majority is measured by the fairness standard.' 4
Their conclusion that two-step mergers are per se lawful is based on the
theory that these mergers are equivalent to ordinary asset acquisitions by
unrelated companies.' 0 5 This analogy is inaccurate in several respects. First,
in an ordinary asset acquisition, the minority shareholders of the selling
company retain their equity interest after the transaction. Second, unlike an
ordinary asset acquisition, freezeout mergers are interested transactions in
which the acquiring company is able to set unilaterally the terms of the
merger agreement. The potential for self-dealing which this creates is absent
in ordinary asset acquisitions because the transacting companies are by
definition unrelated. To prevent such self-dealing, Brudney and Chirelstein
suggest that the price paid in the merger to the minority shareholders be the
same as the price offered on the initial tender. 106 They claim that this will
ensure a fair price for the minority shareholders being cashed out. This
solution to the self-dealing problem is inadequate, however, for it assumes
that the cash price offered on the initial tender will represent a fair price from
which to measure the fairness of the consideration offered in the subsequent
freezeout merger. Tender offers themselves, however, are coercive and often
do not represent an accurate measure of true stock value. The fact that the
shareholders are dispersed, uninformed, and often concerned about the possibility of later being cashed out causes the tender offer price to be lower than
true stock value.10 7 Although Brudney and Chirelstein recognize this problem, they offer no solution and, as a result, the potential for self-dealing
remains. The third problem with the analogy is that it ignores the adverse tax
consequences to the minority shareholders who are forced to receive cash and
to recognize taxable gain or loss on the transaction.' 0 8 These tax consequences
100. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 17, at 1354.
101. Id. at 1365.
102. Id. at 1359.
103. Id. at 1370.
104. Id. at 1359.
105. Id. at 1360.
106. Id. at 1361.
107. See Nathan & Maloney, State Tender Offer Statutes: An Analysis of the Practical and
Policy Considerations, 23 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 647, 679 (1978). Brudney and Chirelstein also
liken the initial tender to a conventional majority vote of the shareholders. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 17, at 1360. The coerciveness and unfairness of the initial tender, as described
above, shows the inaccuracy of this analogy.
108. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
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are absent in ordinary asset acquisitions in which the shareholders of the
transacting companies retain their equity interests. Because two-step and
long-held-affiliate mergers present, for common reasons, equal potential for
unfairness, it is suggested that the fairness standard be applied to both. For
this same reason, both types of mergers are discussed here under the single
rubric of parent-subsidiary mergers.
Although both Singer and Tanzer involved parent-subsidiary mergers, the
principles enunciated therein are equally applicable to shell corporation
mergers. In fact, Singer's and Tanzer's disapproval of a merger, the sole
purpose of which is the elimination of minority shareholders, would appear to
invalidate all shell corporation mergers because, in one sense, their only
purpose is the elimination of minority shareholders. Brudney and Chirelstein
also argue for a per se rule invalidating all shell corporation mergers.' 0 9 This
rule is not justified, however, because shell corporation mergers may in some
cases have valid economic justifications. 1 0 Consider, for example, a public
company of 300 shareholders, one of whom owns a one-third interest in the
company and is uncooperative in solving the company's problems. Although
the company may be in serious financial trouble, the recalcitrant shareholder
is able to block any solutions with the vote of his one-third interest. By
freezing him out of the company, the other 299 shareholders would be able to
eliminate not only the problems which he creates for the company but also the
costs of SEC disclosures."' Therefore, rather than making rigid distinctions
between shell corporation and parent-subsidiary mergers, it is more appropriate to recognize various merger purposes, which may or may not outweigh the
accompanying unfairness. Thus, the balancing approach of the entire fairness
standard seems to provide a workable test for court approval of all classes of
freezeout mergers and at the same time avoids the mechanical approach of
Brudney and Chirelstein's per se rule.
B.

The Valid Purpose Requirement

In addition to the fiduciary duty to be fair to minority shareholders when
freezing them out, Singer and Tanzer held that this duty would not be met if
the majority did not have some valid purpose for the freezeout merger.
Because the court did not fully explain the new purpose requirement, its scope
and future implications are still uncertain. Moreover, the requirement at
present suffers from two weaknesses. First, the precedent upon which the
court relied does not provide substantial support for establishing the requirement. Second, the requirement adds little to the fairness standard and only
confuses the real issue in freezeout mergers--whether their economic justifications outweigh the unfairness to the minority shareholders.
In adding the business purpose requirement to the entire fairness standard,
the Singer court relied primarily on Guth v. Loft, Inc. 112 The Singer court
borrowed language from the Guth opinion describing the fiduciary duty owed
by directors' 13 and applied this same duty to the majority shareholders in the
109.

Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 17, at 1359.

110.
111.

See notes 21-28 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.

112.
113.

23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
The court in Singer borrowed the following language from Guth: "While technically not
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freezeout context.1 14 The requirement that the majority shareholders meet the
same standards of loyalty and care as directors is based on the reasoning that,
by assuming control of the corporation in voting for the merger, the shareholders are in effect taking the position of directors in forming corporate
policy.' s This analogy is not completely applicable to freezeout mergers.
Although the director is never permitted to injure the corporation to which he
owes his duty, the majority shareholders should in some situations be relieved
of their duty not to injure the minority when their actions actually benefit the

corporation.11 6 The synergistic gain discussed above is a specific example of

such a benefit. This element of corporate benefit is in direct contrast to Guth,
in which a president had acquired a corporate opportunity using corporate
funds-a clear example of injury to the company. Thus, the action by a
director which works harm to the corporation is not directly analogous to
mergers, which are "encouraged and
favored" for the benefits they confer
7
upon the corporations involved."
The Singer court found an additional precedent for the business purpose
rule in a statement in Bennett v. Breuil Petroleum Corp., 118 that "action by
majority stockholders having as its primary purpose the 'freezing out' of a

minority interest is actionable without regard to the fairness of the price."" t 9
This statement was taken out of context, however, because Bennett did not
involve-a freezeout. Instead, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder, complained
that the majority shareholders had issued new stock for an inadequate price

and that his interest in the company would be diluted if he did not buy a pro

rata share of the issuance.' 20 Moreover, the court in Bennett did not rest its

trustees, [corporate directors] stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders.
A public policy... has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director... the
most scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect the interests of the
corporation committed to his charge, but also to refrain from doing anything that would work
injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and ability might
properly bring to it ..
" Id. at 270, 5 A.2d at 510; see Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311
(1939).
114. "[T]he spirit of the definition [of the directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholders] is
equally applicable to a majority stockholder in any context in which the law imposes a fiduciary
duty on that stockholder for the benefit of minority stockholders." Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d at 977; accord, Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947) (majority's redemption of minority's shares at a low price prior to liquidation of the company was a breach of the
majority shareholders' fiduciary duty).
115. See Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369, 372 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S.
675 (1942) (vote of every director and every majority shareholder must be cast in favor of the
corporation's interests). See generally Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co., 14 Del.
Ch. 1, 120 A. 486 (Ch. 1923).
116. Again, using a broad balancing test rather than a per se rule would bring situations like
this to light.
117. MacFarlane v. North Am. Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 172, 178, 157 A. 396, 398 (Ch.
1928).

118. 34 Del. Ch. 6, 99 A.2d 236 (Ch. 1953).
119. 380 A.2d at 979 (quoting Bennett v. Breull Petroleum Corp., 34 Del. Ch. at 12, 99 A.2d
at 239).
120. Bennett, therefore, involved the right not to purchase as opposed to the right not to sell
in freezeout mergers: "[Pylaintiff has the right not to purchase as well as the right to purchase. But
his right not to purchase is seriously impaired if the stock is worth substantially more than its
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decision on the language quoted by Singer, but rather it required the minority
shareholder to prove constructive fraud, a standard significantly different
from a valid purpose requirement. 12 1 Therefore, the above language from
Bennett should not be applied to freezeout mergers and, in any event, does
not appear to justify the valid purpose requirement enunciated in Singer.
In addition to the weakness of precedent for the valid purpose test, the test
itself is unsatisfactory because it is confusing and adds little to the fairness
standard. Although Tanzer attempted to answer the question of whose
purpose by stating that a valid purpose would include one that directly
benefits only the parent company, 122 it left unclear whether a valid economic
purpose on the shareholder level, rather than the corporate level, would
satisfy the requirement. Ironically, the Singer court, which established the
test, recognized this confusion when it said: "Any inquiry into the business
purpose of a merger immediately leads to such questions as: 'Whose purpose?'
or 'Whose business?' "123 In general, a distinction between a corporate
purpose and a shareholder purpose for freezeout mergers makes little sense
because in either case a valid economic reason for the merger may exist. A
conflict of interest between shareholders in a close corporation offers one
example of a bona fide shareholder purpose. If a minority shareholder in that
corporation proved to be uncooperative, thereby creating a risk of deadlock,
the other shareholders would have a valid economic reason to freeze him out
by way of a shell corporation merger. 124 If the valid purpose requirement
enunciated in Singer and Tanzer prevented such a merger because the purpose
originates on the shareholder level, 125 the result would be unjust and arbitrary.
issuing price." 34 Del. Ch. at 14, 99 A.2d at 240. This represents a further distinction between
Singer and Bennett in that the right not to purchase gives the shareholder the right to refrain
from doing something that would work hardship to him if he were financially unable to exercise
the right. The right not to sell, on the other hand, protects a right which is independent of the
shareholder's financial status because he can always sell his shares without substantial economic harm.
121. Although constructive fraud is a vague gauge of fiduciary obligation, it apparently
requires some kind of bad faith on the part of the majority. See id. at 13-14, 99 A.2d at 240.
122. 379 A.2d at 1125.
123. 380 A.2d at 976. The same confusion occurs in corporate tax law where the business
purpose test is applied to corporate reorganizations. See B. Bittker & J.Eustice, Federal Income
Taxation of Corporations and Shareholders § 14.51 (3d ed. 1971). Compare Gregory v. Helvering,
293 U.S. 465 (1935) with Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 844 (1974).
124. This example is based on the facts of Matteson v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash. 2d 286, 242 P.2d
1025 (1952), in which a minority shareholder tried to block a proposed sale of the corporation's
stock that was economically beneficial to the company and its stockholders. The majority
eliminated him by way of a shell corporation freezeout merger. When the minority shareholder
sued to enjoin the merger, the court upheld the merger cn the ground that the appraisal statute,
absent proof of actual fraud on the part of the majority, was exclusive. The holding has been
interpreted, however, as being based on a valid business purpose in the elimination of a
troublemaking shareholder, rather than on the exclusive nature of the appraisal statute. Vorenberg, supra note 5, at 1196.
125. One commentator has suggested that mergers should be prohibited if their purposes
originate on the shareholder level. See Borden, Some Comments on Singer v. Magnavox,
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1977, at 3, col. 2. Although Tanzer affirmed Singer's purpose requirement, the
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An additional problem with the valid purpose requirement is its tendency to
direct a court's attention solely to the purpose of a merger and away from the
majority's purpose for paying cash rather than stock to the minority shareholders. 126 Thus, courts may fail to recognize an unfair merger in which
corporate planners fabricate nonexistent purposes to disguise the fact that
their sole motivation is the elimination of the minority shareholders. 127 The
entire fairness standard, however, promotes a broader analysis of all aspects
of the merger and prevents overemphasis
on the business purposes suggested
28
by the majority shareholders.'
CONCLUSION

Singer and Tanzer are significant because they increase the needed state
protection for minority shareholders in freezeout mergers. Although they
establish both the entire fairness and the valid purpose tests, the latter is
confusing and unnecessary and should be abolished.' 2 9 It is more appropriate

to make the merger's purpose just one of the factors to be considered in
determining the entire fairness of the merger. Unfortunately, the Supreme
Court of Delaware has not darified the entire fairness standard by enumerating the relevant factors to be considered and thus has left Delaware law

governing freezeout mergers in a state of ambiguity. If a broad balancing test
is adopted, which enables courts to weigh both the economic justifications and

the potential unfairness of freezeout mergers on a case-by-case basis, the
Delaware decisions in Singer and Tanzer will have started an important trend

toward adequate state protection for minority shareholders in these mergers.
Robert Biggart
court altered its language on the ground that a "business purpose" test was ambiguous and stated
a result rather than a right or duty. 379 A.2d at 1123. The court therefore used the term "bona
fide purpose" instead of "business purpose." Id. at 1124. Although the Supreme Court of
Delaware offered no explanation, it is possible that when it modified the "business purpose"
language to "bona fide purpose" in Tanzer, it was indicating that the purpose can also occur on
the shareholder level.
126. Although a merger may have an economic justification, this does not mean that payment
of cash rather than stock is justified. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
127. See Folk, Holdings by State Court Grounded in PriorLaw, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 19, 1977, at
41, col. 3.
128. The bona fide purpose requirement of Tanzer could therefore be encompassed within the
fairness standard. This approach was advocated by a concurring opinion in Singer: "To
determine whether that burden has been met under Sterling, I think the Court must scrutinize the
business purpose, or economic necessity, desirability and feasibility involved, evidence of
self-serving, manipulation, or overreaching, and all other relevant factors of intrinsic fairness or
unfairness. Upon finding a breach of the fiduciary duty owed, the Court must then grant such
relief as the circumstances require, by injunction, appraisal, damages, or other available
equitable relief .......
380 A.2d at 982 (McNeilly, J., concurring).
129. A further reason for abolishing the business purpose test is that it creates the anomalous
situation of prohibiting mergers designed solely to eliminate the minority when it is recognized
that shareholders no longer have a vested right to continued participation in the company. See
note 2 supra and accompanying text.

